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Secretary of Labor Exceeded Rule Making Power
Under the FMLA With Regulation That May Grant Employees More Than the
Statutorily Authorized 12 Weeks.
In Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc. The
Supreme Court Strikes down Regulation
Creating an Irrefutable Presumption That an Employee is Prejudiced by Failure
to Receive Notification from Employer of Designation of Leave as FMLA Leave.
The
recent Supreme Court decision in Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc.[1]
limited the power of the Secretary of Labor (the “Secretary”) to promulgate
rules under the Family and Medical Leave Act (the “FMLA”).[2] The Court held that the Secretary exceeded
her power by promulgating a regulation that would result in employees receiving
more leave than Congress authorized in the act.
The FMLA allows eligible employees of covered
employers 12 weeks of unpaid leave per twelve month period for child rearing in
the first year after a child’s birth or placement with the employee for
adoption or foster care, or for the serious health condition of the employee or
of a close family member who needs the employee’s care.[3] Covered employers are those who employ
“...50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more
calender workweeks in the present or preceding calender year.”[4] To be eligible the employee must have worked
for the employer at least 12 months.[5] The employee also is required to have worked
for 1250 hours in the 12 month period immediately preceding the commencement of
the leave.[6] While the employee is on FMLA leave the
employer must maintain the employee’s group health insurance coverage.[7] Upon the expiration of the leave the
employer must reinstate the employee to his or her former position or an
equivalent position.[8]
The regulations issued by the Secretary require an
employee who wishes to take FMLA leave to give the employer 30 days notice if
the need for leave is foreseeable.[9] Where there is an emergency or where other
special circumstances exist the employee must give as much notice as is
practicable. The employer is required
by the regulations to notify the employee if the requested leave is designated
by the employer as FMLA leave.[10] If the employer notifies the employee of its
designation orally it must be confirmed in writing no later than the following
payday. If that payday is less than one
week after the oral notice the written confirmation must be given by the next
subsequent payday.[11] Written notice must be given to the
employee with information about the
employee’s rights and duties under the act “... within a reasonable time after
notice of the need for is given by the employee –within one or two business
days if feasible.”[12]
Employers are prohibited from interfering with
employees’ rights under the FMLA or denying those rights.[13] Where the employer violates those rights the
employee may maintain an action for lost wages and benefits or actual monetary
losses such as the cost of providing care for up to 12 weeks wages.[14]
The Ragsdale decision focused on one sentence
in 29 CFR § 825.700(a). “If an employee
takes paid or unpaid leave and the employer does not designate the leave as
FMLA leave, the leave taken does not count against an employee’s FMLA
entitlement.” Ms. Ragsdale argued that
since her employer had not designated the 30 weeks it allowed her for treatment
of Hodgkin’s disease as FMLA leave, the regulation entitled her to a 12 week
extension of her leave. The district
court’s grant of summary judgement to Wolverine was affirmed by the Eighth
Circuit which was in turn affirmed in a five to four decision of the Supreme
Court.
The majority opinion emphasized that it is
unreasonable to allow an employee additional leave even where the individual
suffers no prejudice by virtue of not receiving notice of designation.[15] It is possible that the employee will be
fully aware of the 12 week limit on leave and counted on the leave taken being
charged against the individual’s FMLA leave entitlement even without the
notice. The Court noted that “...the
regulation establishes an irrebuttable presumption that the employee’s exercise
of FMLA rights was impaired and the employee deserves 12 more weeks. There is no empirical or logical basis for
this presumption...”[16] The regulation does not take note of the
possibility that the employee may have been fully aware of the 12 week
limitation or that the employee may have acted no differently if the notice had
been given.[17] While the statute prohibits an employer from
interfering with an employee’s FMLA rights the regulation does away with the
need for the employee to prove that there was any such interference.[18]
The Court pointed out that Congress’s decision to allow
12 weeks of FMLA was the result of a compromise reached during the legislative
process. An extension of leave beyond
that 12 weeks by regulation fails to afford the deference due to that
compromise.[19] Attention was further directed to the
expression in the statute that it is not intended “to discourage employers from
adopting or retaining leave policies more generous...” than those required by
the act.[20] The majority reasoned that the challenged
regulation would discourage employers from providing more leave than the act
requires if this additional leave might not be counted towards the employee’s
statutory allotment. Where an
inadvertent failure to characterize the leave as FMLA leave or an inability to
do so within the time required by the regulation would penalize the employer’s
voluntary offer of benefits that offer might be withdrawn.[21] The Court observed that the only notice
requirement in the statute is for the employer to post notice of employees’
statutory entitlements in a conspicuous place.[22] The penalty for non compliance with that
requirement is a $100 fine,[23]
far less than that imposed by the regulation.
The Court specifically reserved judgement on whether the Secretary could
require additional notice, finding that the challenged regulation would be
invalid nonetheless.[24]
The Ragsdale opinion did not have occasion to
address another regulation which would likely fall by the same reasoning. The so called “estoppel regulation,” 29 CFR
§ 825.110(d), in some cases would allow an employee who has not worked the
statutorily required 1250 hours in the preceding 12 months to be eligible for
FMLA leave. The regulation provides, in
part, that when an otherwise ineligible employee requests FMLA leave:
If the employer fails to advise the employee whether
the employee is eligible prior to the date the requested leave is to commence,
the employee will be deemed eligible.
The employer may not, then, deny the leave. Where the employee does not give notice of the need for leave
more than two business days prior to commencing leave, the employee will be
deemed to be eligible if the employer fails to advise the employee that the
employee is not eligible within two business days of receiving the employee’s
notice.
Lower courts considering this regulation have found it
to be invalid as an unauthorized extension of FMLA entitlement to those who
have not met the statutory requirements for eligibility. The Seventh Circuit in Dornmeyer v.
Comerica Bank-Illinois[25]
declined to allow FMLA leave to an employee who had not worked the required
1250 hours in the preceding 12 month period where the employer failed to notify
her whether or not she was eligible for leave.
The court found that the Secretary did not have the power to allow leave
by regulation to individuals who had not worked the hours required by the
statute. It further took cognizance of
the fact that the only notice requirement in the statute is in section 2619
which requires posting in the workplace of a summary of the FMLA. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Dormeyer
decision in Brungart v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.,[26]
also finding the regulation to be an invalid expansion of the statute.
There seems to be little room to doubt that if the
estoppel regulation came before the Supreme Court the rationale of the Ragsdale
decision would apply to invalidate it.
[1] 122
S.Ct. 1155 (March 19, 2002)
[2] 29
U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.
[3] 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A), (B),
(C) and (D)
[4] 29
U.S.C. § 2611 (4)(A)(i)
[5] 29
U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)(i)
[6] 29
U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)(ii)
[7] 29
U.S.C. § 2614 (c)(1)
[8] 29
U.S.C. §2614(a)(1)
[9] 29
CFR § 825.302(a)
[10] 29
CFR § 825.208(a)
[11] 29
CFR § 825.208(b)(2)
[12] 29
CFR § 825.301(c)
[13] 29
U.S.C § 2615(a)(1)
[14] 29
U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(I) & (II)
[15] 122 S.Ct at 1161
[16] Id.
at 1162
[17] Id.
at 1161
[18] Id.
[19] Id.
at 1163-64
[20] 29
U.S.C. § 2653, Id. at 1160, 1164
[21] Id.
at 1165
[22] 29
U.S.C. § 2619(a)
[23] 29
U.S.C. § 2619(b)
[24] Id.
at 1160, 1161
[25] 223
F.3d 579, 582 (7th Cir. 2000)
[26] 231
F.3d 791 (11th Cir. 2000)
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